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PEOPLE

[L. A. No. 17826.

v.

RICCIARDI

In Bank.

[23 C.2d

Dec. 21, 1943.J

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ANTONINO RICCIARDI
et al., Respondents.
[1] Eminent D?main-Compensation-Damnum Absque Injuria.

-:-l~ a,,:ardmg damages in eminent domain, not every depreCIatIOn lD the value of property not taken can be made the
basis of an a ward of damages.

[2] :a:ighwaYS:-Ri~hts ~f Abutter.-An abutting owner has two
kmds of rI~h.ts lD a hIghway, a public right which he enjoys with
a~l other clt~zens,and certain private rights which arise from
hIS. ownershIp of, property contiguous to the highway, and
,,:hICh are not common to the public generally. His special
fIght ?f easement an.d user in the highway for access purposes IS a p~oper~y rIght which cannot be damaged or taken
away from hIm WIthout due compensation.
(3] EminentDomain~Compensation_What Constitutes Taking
o~ Da~aging .. - "Actionable interference" with a property
r~ght IS no different from "substantial impairment" of the
rIght.

[4] High~ays-A1teration-Damages-Diversion of Traffic.-An
abuttmg owner has no property right in any particular flow
of traffic over the highway, and the re-routing or diver~ion of
normal traffic is not compensable; but he does have the right
o~ direct access to the highway and an easement of reasonable
Vlew of .the pro~erty from such highway, and are-routing
of t~e hIghway l~ relation to the property, not a mere reroutm~ of traffic m relation to the highway, is a taking and
damagmg of the owner's private rights and is compensable.
[6] Eminent Domain-Remedies for Unlawful Taking.-When
com~ensation is claimed either for a taking or a damaging,
the Issues may be presented for adjudication either in a proceeding in eminent domain or by a property owner's action
for compenElation for the taking or damaging of his property
or both, as the case may be.

[2] Damages for widening street as including injury to access
note, 64 A:L.R. 1527. See, also, 10 Cal.Jur. 333; 18 Am.Jur. 789. '
McK. DIg. Referen~es: [lJ Em~nent Domain, § 47; [2,19J Highways, § 107; [3] EmlI~ent DomaI~, § 45; [4, 10, 12-17, 19] Highways, § 62; [5, 6J Emment Domam, § 194; [7] Eminent Domain
§ 66; [8) Eminent Domain, § 71; [9] Eminent Domain § 92' [U'
18] Eminent Domain, § 161.
'
,
,
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[6] Id. - Remedies for Unlawful Taking -,Pro~edural Differences.-':ln an action for damages for the taking or .damaging of private property without compensation ihe:property
owner assumes the burden of alleging'arid" ptovirig'li1s;property right and the infringement thereof,' tind the' qttestion '
whether his allegations in that behalf are: sufficient, may···· be .
determined on demurrer. In a proceeding ineininent domain:
the condemning authority, in commencing it,affirmatively
alleges ownership in the property. owner", the ,contemplated
taking and severance, and seeks a determination. by,,~the :.court
. of issues confided by law to its decision, as'well,ua;.determination by the jury, unless one be waiyed"as to,the':compensation which should be paid to' him... , . " ' "
[7] Id.-Compensation- Value of PropertyTaken~.-:-The law
has adopted market value as establishing actnal,value of
property taken for public use.
[8] Id. - Compensation - Damages to OontiguousLand -:-How .
Determined.-If property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger, parcel, the damages are' to be
determined by ascertaining the market v.alueofthe portion
not sought to be taken, and by deducting therefrom the market value thereof after the severance and construction of the
improvement.
[9] Id.-Compensation-Evidence-Damages toContlgUou8 Land.
-Damages to contiguous land may be shown 'by proving the market value of the remainder before and after the
taking and leaving the computation of the difference to the
jury, or by competent evidence of severance damages in a
lump sum.
[10] Highways..,..A1teration-Damages.-Damages may not be
allowed for diminution of property value resulting from highway changes causing diversion of traffic; circuity of travel
beyond an intersecting street, or other noncompensable items.

[11] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Trial-Province of OOltrt
and Jury.-When an eminent domain proceeding comes on
for hearing, all issues except the sole issue relating to compensation, are to be tried by the court, and if the court does
not make special findings on those issues its findings thereon
al'e implicit in the verdict awarding compensation.

[12] Highways---'Alteration-Damages-Provfnce of Oourt' and
Jury.-In an action in eminent· domain to condemn land for
the widening of a state highway, it was within the province
of the trial court and not the jury to pass upon the question
whether under the facts presented, the defendant abutting
owners' right of access would be substantially impaired.
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[13J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Province of Court and Jury.In an action in eminent domain to condemn land for the
widening of a stato highway, the question whether the abutting o.wners possessed a right which was damaged was for
the trIal court to determine.

[14J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Province of Court and Jury.In an action in eminent domain to condemn land for the
widening of a state highway, it was for the trial court to
determine whether an obstruction caused by a proposed underpass wou~d. u?:easonably cut off the abutting owners' property from VISIbIlIty by travelers on the main highway and
the right being substantially impaired, the amount or' dam~
ages was a question for the jury.
[15] Id.-Alteration-Damages-Evidence_Sufficiency._In an
action t? condemn land ~or the widening of a state highway,
the ~ndmgs and conclu~IOns of the trial court implicit in the
verdIct as to the abuttmg owners' loss of their easement of
visibility were supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal.

[16] ~d.-Alteration-Damages-Severance Damages.-In an action to condemn land for the widening of a state highway no
just criticism could be made of the award of severance d~m
ages in the sum of $15,000, where the entire property was
valued at as much as $68,000 and the severance damage was
estimated at as high as $41,759.
[17J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Appeal_Harmless and Reversible Error.~In an ~ction to condemn land for the widening
of a state hIghway, It was error but not prejudicial error for
the court to instruct the ,jury that the question whether the
defendants had suffered an infringement of their rights in the
property not sought to be condemned was a question of fact
for the jury to determine, where the record showed that the
defendants ,,:ould suffer. an infringement of their rights by
the construction of the Improvement in the manner proposed
and the trial court had in effect already so held.
[18] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Tri<tl-Province of Court
and Jury.-In an eminent domain proceeding, the question
wheth?r th~re has been a substantial impairment of a property nght IS one of law,. or of fact, or a mixed question of
~a~ and fac~, for the trIal court to determine. In no case
IS It a questIOn of fact for the jury.

[19] Highways-Alteration-Damages-Instructions._In an ac[14] Easement of view, note, 90 A.L.R. 793. See, also, 25 Am.
J Dr.
451.

Dec. 1943]

PEOPLE 'V. RICCIARDI

393

[23 0.2d 390J

tion to condemn land for the widening of a state highway,
the trial court did not err in refusing an instruction requested
by plaintiff advising- the jury that any element or depreciation in the market value of the property not sought to be
condemned by reason of the construction. of the highway in
the manner proposed would be of a general nat1,11'e and not
special and peculiar to the defendants' property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Caryl M. Sheldon, Judge. Affirmed.
Action in eminent domain to condemn land for widening.
of a state highway. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Lincoln V. Johnson, Clifford D. Good, Holloway Jones,
George C. Hadley, C. R. Montgomery, Frank B. Durkee and
Robert E. Reed for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Everett W. Mattoon,
Deputy Attorney General, Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney,
William H. Neal and Frederiek von Schrader, Assistants City
Attorney, Charles F. Reiehe, Deputy City Attorney, J. Allen
Davis and George E. Sandford as Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Appellant.
Holbrook & Tarr and Leslie R. Tarr for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-In this aetion in eminent domain the plaintiff appeals from a judgment on a verdict :fixing the compensation to be paid to the defendants for the land taken
and for damages to the remainder by. reason of the severance
and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed.
The purpose of the condemnation proceeding is to acquire
land sufficient to effeetuate, by means of an underpass, the
separation of the grade of Rosemead Boulevard at its intersection with Ramona Boulevard in Los Angeles County. The
double tracks of the Pacific Electric' RailwayCoznpany tra~
verse Ramona Boulevard on the route'fl'om Los Angeles to
San Bernardino and cross Rosemead Boulevard at the inter" !"
section.
The defendants are the owners of property located at the
northeast corner of Rosemead and Ramona Boulevl!!'ds,

[23C.2d
both of which are state highways. The property of the defendants is improved with a modern slaughter house and
retail meat market, both set back from the highways so as
to afford parking facilities. A residence with a large storage
basement faces Rosemead Boulevard. Ingress and egress is
afforded the entire property Ii !ong both boulevards, with
driveways leading into the property from the two highways.
At present Rosemead Boulevard fronting on defendants'
property is 60 feet wide. By the proposed improvement It
is intended to make this boulevard 280 feet wide. It will
consist of four lanes, two in the underpass, and two outer
lanes on each side thereof, designated as service roads, the
latter being 30 feet wide. Rosemead Boulevard will commence to pass under Ramona Boulevard at a point southerly
thereof and will come to grade northerly thereof at Glendon
Way, the latter of which is the first cross or intersecting
street north of defendants' pI'operty, approximately 525 feet
north of Ramona Boulevard. The underpass will reach a
maximum depth of seventeen feet. Visibility of traffic in
that portion of the underpass directly in front of the defendants' remaining property on Rosemead Boulevard will
be entirely cut off. Between the underpass and the remaining property a lane designated as a service road thirty feet
in width is provided' for at grade. A ten-foot sidewalk strip
between the service road and the defendants' property is also
provided fo.r. A dividing strip 50 feet wide at Glendon Way
narrowing to 25 feet at the covered portion of the underpass
is between the service road and the easterly wall of the underpass. This strip is left for support and landscaping purposes.
The highway plans show that the portion of Ramona
Boulevard to the north of the railway right of way is to
have a 35 foot freeway for westbound fast traffic and an
outer lane 30 feet wide, also called a service road, for local
traffic. To the south of the railway right of way a similar
freeway for eastbound fast traffic is provided for. The service road on Rosemead Boulevard and the service road on
Ramona Boulevard will connect at the southeast corner of
the defendants' property and at that point there is access
to the westbound traffic on Ramona Boulevard. The service
road on Rosemead extends to Glendon Way, which is the next
intersecting street to the north. There is a conflict in the
evidence as to whether the service road paralleling- Ramona
Boulevard extends to the next intersecting street to the east.
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The service roads are at the grade of defendants' property.
When the underpass is constructed upon the westerly portion
of the property taken from the defendants the grade of Rosemead Boulevard will be changed 80 as to effectively block, •
all ingress and egress to and from the main highway except
by traversing the service road to Glendon Way . and then.
making a left turn into the boulevard~ . . ' , " ; 1 '.' •.... ' .1\
A verdict was rendered awarding the .d~f~ndml~ $9,QOQ,\
for the taking of parcel 1, and damagesto~e~ ;r~~ainR-.~r J>y,t
reason of the severance and the .constructi0:t::t,o,~. the.• imp,~o;V~U}
mentin the manner proposed mthesum ,of ,$l,5,OOO!;c: F()~~t
the taking of parcel 2, the sum of $350.was8ll.o!¥d,)With n~;I
severance damages.
., . ; . .., / ,"': ,. :;) .. '.;.!
The main attack on the judgment is the award.Jor sever- )
ance damages. During the course of the trial, witIlesseswere
produced to prove market values.. .On ,the exairiin,ation ofi"
the defendants' witnesses the plaintiiI took .the position and.
now asserts that considerations of interference. with .the de~.l
fendants' right of access to th,e main highway:resulting from,t
the construction of the improvement and. the consequent en-.
forced circuity of travel to and from' the property to the
main highway as proposed may not proI>erly be. taken into
account in fixing severance damages; also,that the defenda~ts' claimed loss of visibility to and from the main highway.
as proposed could not be taken into considerll-tiOl:l 'as aiIe.cting
market value. At the instance of the plaintiiI,thetrial"cQurt
at first excluded all evidence relating to' those' .subjects, but.
finally was persuaded by the defendants 'count~r position
that under the facts presented such interference m,.th access., .
and loss of visibility should be taken into consideration iiI'
determining market value. Accordingly, the court admitted
evidence bearing on those issues and submitted the question.
of the extent of the severance damages caused thereby to' the'
jury. One of the principal contentions of the plaintiiI on
the appeal is the asserted error of the trial court in admitting
that evidence.
[1] Not every depreciation in the value of the property
not taken can be made the basis of an award of damages. In
the absence of a declaration by other competent authority the
courts have been called upon to define rights claimed to be
infringed in violation of section 14, article I, .of the Constitution; also to place limitations on the extent 'of those rights'
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and to declare when and under what circumstances· recovery
may be had by the property owner for a violation thereof.
The ~ourts have assumed the burden and responsibility of
defimng those rights and of limiting their extent because of
the necessity of safeguarding the constitutional rights of
private parties on the one hand and on the other hand of
seeing to it that the cost of public improvements involving
the taking and damaging of private property for public use
be not unduly enhanced. The law on the subject of the nature and .ext~mt of the rights o~ the property owner abutting
on a public hIghway and of the mfringement of those rights is
therefore, in substantial part, case law. For example, it has
been held in this state that injury to the business of the
owner or occupant of the property does not form an element
o~ the compensating damages to be awarded (Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber etc. Co., 171 Cal. 392 [153 P. 705]).
This is so because it is only the value of, and the damage to
the. proper:y itself, which may be considered. A particula:
busmess mIght be entirely destroyed and yet not diminish
the actual value of the property for its highest and best use.
(See 10 Cal.Jur. 341, sec. 55.) It has also been held in this
state that an abutting owner has no right to compensation
by reason of diversion of traffic away from his property (Rose
v. St.ate ~f California, 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ; People
v. G~ann~, 130 Cal.App. 584 [20 P.2d 87] ; City of Stockton
v. M~rengo, 137 Cal.App. 760 [31 P.2d 467]).
Nelth~r in the Co~sti.tution nor in statutes do we find any
declaratIOn of the mCldents of ownership or elements of
v~lue which specifically creates or defines or limits the two
r~g~ts which are ~volved he:e. But we do find general proVISIOns of la:w. WhICh are baSIC to our consideration. Section
658 of th~ CIvil Code declares that "Real or immovable property conslSts of: 1. Land; 2. That which is affixed to land'
3. That :which is incidental or appurtenant to land . . . ":
and sectIOn 662 of the same code defines appurtenances in
general language as follows: "A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right used with
the land for its benefit, as in the case of a way, or watercourse, or of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across
the land of an.ot,her." Section 1248 and related sections of
~he Code of CIVIl Procedure, which prescribe the procedure
In condemnation actions, do not assume to create rights of

ownership, or to define the incidents thereof or the elements
of value. It is, therefore, necessary for this co.urt to determine whether the claimed items are, or shall be, included
among the incidents or appurtenances of real property within
the purview of the generai definition of appurtenances above
quoted, and are therefore to be considered as elements of
value attaching to private property and for which compensation must be paid when the same is· taken or damaged for a
public use in eminent domain proceedings.
The courts of this state, from time immemorial and in
cases too numerous to mention, have declared and enforced
the abutting property owner's right to a free and convenient
use of and access to the highway on which his property abuts.
(Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. 00., 103 Cal. 614, 617 [37
P. 570, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149]; Geurkink v. Oity of Petalwma,
112 Cal. 306, 308 [44 P. 570] ; O'Oonnor v. Southern Pacific
R. R. Co., 122 Cal. 681 [55 P. 688] ; Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 280 [57 P. 82]; Eachus
City of Los
Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147] ; Smith
v. Southern PacifiC R. R. 00., 146 Cal. 164 [79 P. 868, 106
Am.St.Rep. 17]; Williams v. Los Angeles Railway 00., 150
Cal. 592 [89 P. 330] ; Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 160 Cal. 288,
299 [116 P. 750] ; Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 00., 208 Cal.
29, 33 [280 P. 109] ; McCandless v. Oity of Los Angeles, 214
Cal. 67, 71 [4 P.2d 139] ; Rose v. State, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713,
727 [123 P.2d 505] ; Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), p. 177;
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed.), vol. 4, pp. 79,
85; Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed..) , p. 503.) It was declared in the case of Eachus v. Los .Angeles etc. Ry. 00.,
supra, 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 570, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149], at p. 617,
that this right of ingress and egress attaches to the lot and
is a right of property as fully as is the lot itself and any
act by which that easement is destroyed or substantially impaired for the benefit of the public, is a damage to the lot
itself, within the meaning of the constitutional provision
under which the owner is entitled to compensation.
[2] It is also the settled law that "An abutting owner
has two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which
he enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the pub~
lic generally; • •• An abutting landowner on a public high-
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way has a special right of easement and user in the public
road for access purposes, and this is a property right which
cannot be damaged or taken away from him without due compensation. [Citing cases.]" (Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry.
Co., 208 Cal. 29, 33 [280 P. 109].)
But as we view. the record in this case we are not called
upon to declare new rights of property in the abutting owner
but to define the extent of existing rights, to determine
whether the trial court committed error in its rulings on the
admission of evidence on the subjects of impairment of access
and loss of visibility as affecting the market value of the
defendants' existing property rights and whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court on those subjects are
supported by sufficient evidence.
The plaintiff does not take the position that the evidence
is insufficient to support some award of severance damages
based on other elements bearing on market value. There is
evidence of substantia.l severance damages on account of a
reduction in size of the remaining land, of the severance of
the remaining land into an irregular strip, of the curtailment
of the remaining parking area, of the reduction of the commercially ~oned portion Qf the property whic;h corners upon
the two hIghways, and of the impairment of the ,use of the
property as a functioning unit caused by the taking of integral parts of the operating plant. No complaint is made
of the consideration of those matters in fixing severance damages. But it is insisted by the plaintiff that no actionable
interference with the right of access results from so-called
:ircuity of travel to which an abutting owner may be subJected as the result ~f the construction of a public improvement; that such an mterference is but an inconvenience suffered only in :ommon with the general public; that it· has
no proper relatIOn to the abutting property owner's easement
of I~gress and egress and that it cannot therefore be. a right
specIal .an~ peculiar to his right of property. Counsel for
the. plam~ ~pparently concede that if the interference is
actIonable It IS a proper matter to be considered in fixing
co~pens~tion, for it is said in that behalf that "under the
CalIforma 'or damages' clause compensation is not· allowed
except for .an actionable interference with a property ~ight."
[3] "~ctIonable interference" with a property right can
be no dIfferent/rom "s~?stantial impairment" of the right
as that phrase 18 so famIlIarly used in the cases.
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[4] The contention that the disPuted elements of damage-the taking or impairment of the right of direct access
to the through highways and the taking or impairment of the
right of visibility to and from the one highway (Rosemead
Boulevard) in relation to the remaining property-are noncompensable as bein~ the result of police power regulation,
cannot be sustained under the facts and law applicable here.
We recognize that the defendants have no property right.in
any particular flow of traffic over the highway adjacent to
their property, but they do possess the right of direct access
to the through traffic highway and an easement of reasonable
view of their property from such highway. If traffic normally flowing over that highway were re~routed or if another highway were constructed which resulted' in' a substantialamount of traffic being diverted from that through highway the value of their property might thereby be~niinished,
but in such event defendants would have no right· to comperi~ .
sation by reason of such re-routing or, :diyersion: of traffic.
The re-routing or diversion of traffic in> such a: coase would
be a mere police power regulation, or the"~:naidental result
of a lawful act, and not the taking or' damagmgof a prop-,
erty right. But here we do not have a. mere re-routing
or diversion of traffic from the highway; ~e have, instead,
a substantial change in the highway it~e1fin ',relation to
the defendants' property; i. e.; a re~routhig of·thehigh~
way in relation to defendants' property rather than a"mere
re-routing of traffic in relation to the highway. pefendants'
private property rights in and to that highway are to he taken
and damaged. It is only for such private" property :rights
that compensation has been assessed; 'Th,ecour,t 'iillowedno
damages to be predicated on any diversion of traffic from the
highway but it did properly allow damages to. be;based on
diversion of the highway from direct access to defendants'
..
..
property.
Prior to the enactment in 1879 of section 14 of article 1
of the Constitution the problem of compensating for damages
to the remainder where the whole .parcel was not taken did
not arise. Compensation for the land taken for public use was
the only matter for consideration. In Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492 [6 P. 317, 56 Am.Rep. 109], it was held
for the first time that the addition of the words "or damaged" embraced more than the " taking" provided for in
0

0

0
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the Constitution of 1849, and gave to the property owner a
remedy which he did not previously have. The addition of
the "or damaged" phrase in the present constitutional provision has given rise to many difficult problems with reference to the extent of the rights of the owner of property
damaged where none is taken and where part of a larger
parcel is taken and the remainder is claimed to be damaged
by reason of the severance and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed. Where the whole is taken
no question of severance damages is, of course, involved.
[0] When compensation is claimed either for a taking or a damaging the issues may be presented for adjUdication in at least
two forms of action. In one there is an absence of a proceeding in eminent domain. In that form of action the property
owner seeks relief by bringing an action for compensation
for a taking or a damaging of his property or both, as the
case may be. Illustrative of that class of cases with many
others in our reports are McCandless v. City of Los Angeles,
214 Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 139], the more recent case of Rose v.
State of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505], and the
current case of Bacick v. Board of Control, ante, p. 343
[144 P.2d 818].
The other form of action is, as here, a proceeding in eminent
domain in which the procedure is laid down by section 1248
and related sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. [6] In
both actions the result is the same in that in each the property
owner receives compensation for the invasion of his private
right; but the procedure in arriving at the result is different.
In the one case the property owner assumes the burden· of
alleging and proving his property right and the infringement thereof, and the question whether his allegations in that
behalf are sufficient may be determined on demurrer. In the
other case the condemning authority, in commencing the proceeding, affirmatively alleges ownership in the defendants,
the contemplated taking and severance, and seeks a determination by the court of issues confided by the law to the
~ecision of the court and also seeks a determination by the
Jury, unless one be waived, of the compensation which should
be paid to the property owner.
It is provided in section 1248 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the jury "must hear such legal testimony as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and there-
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upon must ascertain and assess: 1. The value of the prope~y
sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pe:taming to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or mterest therein; ... 2. If the properly sought to be condemned c?nstitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the daIDages WhICh
will accrue. to the portion not sought to be condemned, ~y
reason of its severance from the portio? sought to ~.e co~~
demned and the construction of the lIDprovetttent m .th~
manner' proposed by the plaintiff." Sectio~ 124~ prOVIdes
that for the purpose of assessing compensatIon and .damages
the "actual value" thereof at the date specified ': ~hall be
the measure of compensation for all property to be actually
taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually
taken but injuriously affected."
[7] The law has adopted market value as establishing actual value. (Sacramento etc. R. R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal.
408 [104 P.979].) The court said in that case at pa~e 409
that as to the land actually taken "the rule is of ulllversal
acceptance that the measure of this damage is the market
value; that is to say, the highest price estimated in ter~s of
money which the land would bring if exposed for sale m the
open market, with reasonable time allowed in which to find
a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all.o:ft~e uses andpu~:
poses to which it was adapted and for whlch It was capable.
[8] As to the damages to the remainder by reason. of t~e
severance an instruction in that case waS approved WhICh lald
down th; rule that such damages should be determined by
ascertaining the market value of the portion not sought to be
taken (as of the date fixed by statute, which in this case was
November 23 1938) and by deducting therefrom the market
value thereof' after the severance and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed. by the pla~n:iff. This
measure of damages is in accordance wlth the provlsIons of the
code sections referred to. [9] Such damages may be shown
by proving the market value of the rema~nder before . and
after the taking and leaving the computatIon of the difference to the jury or by competent evidence of severance damages in a lump s~m as was done by the testimony of witnesses
in this case. [10] Of course, as above indicated, in applying this rule damages may not be allowed for diminu:ion ~f
property value resulting from. highway changes .causmg .diversion of traffic, circuity of travel beyond an mter~ectmg
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stantially impaired. If it will be so impaired the extent of
the impairment is for the jury to determine. This. is but
another way of saying that the trial court and not the Jury
must decide whether in the particular case there win be an
actionable interference with the defendants' right of accp.ss.
'This the trial court did when it ruled on the admission of
evidence and in iU! instructions to the jury.
[13] In admitting the evidence objected to by the plaintiff
the trial court was necessarily guided' by the settled law with
reference to an abutter's rights and by the facts presented
in the case. The record is voluminous and consists of a large
relief map, numerous other maps and many volumes of tran·
scribed testimony. This evidence was before the court at
the close of the defendants' case at which time the ruling
was made permitting the expert witnesses to t.estify to the
effect upon the market value of the property not tvken by
reason o,f the contemplated improvement and the consequent
requirement that the owner must thereafter take another 1'0ute
to reach the through traffic lane which before the improve.
ment was immediately in front of his premises.' To sustain
the plaintiff's position would require a ruling by this court
to the effect that although a landowner's easement of access
has been substantially impaired, under no circumstances
should circuity of travel occasioned thereby enter into a com·
putation of the damages to be awarded. Such a ruling obviously would be beyond the bounds of propriety~' Certainly
the plaintiff would not contend that ifthe,nnderPass becoh~'
structed as proposed and no means of' access' to Rosemead
Boulevard be provided for, the defendants would be without
redress. It is too plain to admit of' argument that if ·the
underpass be constructed as proposed' and" 'the semce' road~
were not provided for in the contemplated improvement,· the
defendants' right of access to Rosemead Boulevard would b~
practically destroyed. In providing for the service' roads the
state must be deemed to have proceeded in frank recognition
of the private right of access possessed by the defendantS,
that such right would be invaded, and intended by meims of
those service roads to minimize and entirely absorb the diitbL
ages to which the defendants would otherwise, be entitled.
But in any event the question whether the defendants possessed a right which was damaged was for the trial court
to determine. As to how much the service roads would Initi·
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gate the damage, i. e., how much would be the net damage,
was a question of fact for the jury. (See Knox Oounty v.
Le Marr, 20 Tenn.App. 258 [97 S.W.2d 659, 661].)
[14] It is also the position of the state that evidence of
loss of visibility has not been justified in this case as a part
of access and that it can be justified on no other, theory.
The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the proposition that an abutting owner of property on a public highway
has an easement of reasonable view of his property from the
highway (90 A.L.R. 793, 794, and cases cited i 29 C.J.B.,
p. 912, sec. 905). The right of reasonable view in addition
to the right of ingress and egress is named as one of the
easements possessed by the abutting owner in Williams v. Los
Angeles By. 00., 150 Cal. 592, 595 [89 P. 332J. Here
again it was for the trial court to determine whether the
obstruction caused by, the underpass would unreasonably cut
off defendants' property from visibility by travelers on the
main highway, and, the right being substantially impaired, the
amount of damage was a question for the jury. [15] The
findings and conclusion of the trial court implicit in the verdict are supported by the evidence and may not now properly
be disturbed.
[16] No just criticism can be made of the severance damages awarded in the light of the record in this case. The
entire property was valued at as much as $68,000 and the
severance damage was estimated as high as $41,779. In view
of this evidence an award of $15,000 on the latter item cannot be set aside on appeal.
[17] The plaintiff complains of certain instructions given
and of the refusal to give others. Instruction No. 22 as given
is assigned as error because by it the court advised the jury
that the question whether the defendants had suffered an
infringement of their rights in the property not sought to be
condemned was a "question of fact for the jury" to determine.
The giving of that instruction was error, but no prejudice resulted from it, because the record shows beyond question that the defendants would suffer an infringement of
their rights by the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed. Furthermore, the trial court had in effect
already held that such impairment would be suffered and
as above stated, its finding and conclusion in that respect,
are implied in the verdict.

Dec. 1943]

PEOPLE

v.

RICCIARDI

[23 C.2d 3901

,

405"

.
. th 0 inion in McCandless ,v; Oityo! :
CertaIn language In e I p67 [4 P .2d 139] i at page 7l~ is H
Los Angeles, supra, 214 Ca.
. t'fying that instruction.'"
ref~rred to b~ ~h~, defen:~n!~ea~;f~:gement of herrlght is ..
It IS there said. . Whet e
l ' fii's property and has re",
special and peculIa: t~ the. pma::t lof her right, is a question,
sulted in a substantial ImpaIr
I in that case was, to
" The purpose of the appea
,
"
of ,fact . . .
I . t to state a cause of actIon
test the sufficiency of the co~p ~In ment of a propertY right
fordamag~ ~or an alle~~dt~~f~~l~e question involve~ on t~e
of the plaIn~lff. Th~t w it the following was saidlmmedl.
appeal and In paSSIng on
ted' "and we think
ately after. the . langua~e la~t a~~:ein~u°riot .only the speci~l
the compl~Int IS suffi~e~: l~nfrin:ement as applied to .sald
and peculIar nature 0 b:tantial impairment of that rlg?t
property, but also t~e s~ d
a matter of law that the plaIn7
At least it may not ~ sal as" uffered no damage." ,
tiff under her allegatIOns h~s s
, .d 'd together it is
[18] When both quotatIOns are cdonsl le~e with the suffith d' cussion had to 0 so e y
state a cause of action. The quoted
obvious that e IS.
ciency of the. cOmplaIn~ to th defendants as justification for
language relIed. upon'y ,e not as full as it might have
the challenged InstructIOn was t f the law so far as it goes.
been, but it is a correct sta!e~e~heo law on the subject would
A more complete stateme~ 0 hether there has been a subhave been that the questIon w
t right is a question of
stantial imp airmen,t of ,her propt.er y Ji law and fact for the
. d ques Ion Ool
,
law or of fact, or a mlxe
. .t a "question of fact
tri;l court to determine. !n no case IS 1
,
for the jury" to determIne.
the refusal to give the
[19] No error a~pears ~ecause ~~ It would have advised
plai~tiff's proposed Instr~ct~o~e~;~ciaiion in market value of.
the Jury that any elemen 0 be condemned by reason of the
the property not sou?ht to
t in the manner proposed
construction of the Impr~vemen d not special. and peculiar
would be of a ge~eral na ure an sub' ect matter of this into the defendants property. ~:e tio! of the jury and was
struction was not for the conSI era
properly
refuse~..
' d by the plaintiff hut
Other instructIOns
gIven are cn' fIClZe
find
0 in any of them.
h
we
no err r
.
f the police power by t e
No question of the exerCIse 0
•
imply a condemnastate is involved in this case. The case 18 s

'.

406

PEOPLE

v.

RICCIARDI

[23 C.2d

ti~n suit in which the only questions properly to be deter-

mI~ed. on ~ppeal are whether the court erred in overruling
ob.JectI~ns Interposed by the state to the introduction of certaIn eVIdence on the question of severance damages whether
the co~rt erred prejudicially in the matter of in~tructions
to the Jury and whether the verdict is supported by the evidence.
Th?re is ~o other contention of the plaintiff which is not
~~ectIvely dIsposed of by the foregoing discussion and authorItIes.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer J. concurred.
' ,
EDMONDS, J.-I am unable to concur in an opinion which
un~upported by authority in this state or elsewhere under th~
~~se of "de~ning" existing property rights, extends the proVISIOns of article I, section 14, of the California Constitution to
a d~~ree ne~er be~ore recognized, thereby establishing rules of
deCISIOn WhICh WIll, in large measure, make the construction
of n~cessary hig?way improvements prohibitive in cost. More
speCIfically, I dIssent from the conclusions of my associates
as stated b~ Mr. Justice Shenk for the following reasons:
(1) ~espIte the law uniformly to the contrary throughout
the Umted States, the decision entitles an abutting property
owner ~o compens~tion for the additional distance he must
t~avel In the ~ubhc street before he reaches the lanes of a
hIghway carrying the through traffic.
(2) In .allowing r~cove~ for such "circuity of travel,"
the .co~rt IS ~lready IgnorIng the restrictions just prescribed
by It I? l!~c~ch v. Board of Oontrol, ante, p. 343 [144 P.2d
818J, lImItIng rec.overy to the owners of property lying between an obstruction .and the first intersecting street.
(3) Fo~ the first tIme in the .iudicial history of the state
reco~ery IS allowed because the main Bow of traffic, whe~
pas~Ing through a subway constructed for the safe and convement use of :the highway, will no longer have a completely
unobstructed ~Iew of the abutting landowner's premises.
(4) In statIng the rule creating this right of view aO'ainst
the State, the decisions distinguishing between the ~law-
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ful impairment or obstruction of view in the public street
by a private individual and a lawful interference with the
view of abutting property occasioned by necessa17 and proper
highway construction, are ignored.
.
(5) Although recognizing the established rule in thiS state
denying compensation for a diminution in value of land
occasioned by a highway project diverting traffic" from in
front of his premises, the court inconsistently holds that the
owner may recover damages because a person' traveling upon
the street as rebuilt no longer can view his property.
(6) The opinion studiously avoidS passing upon one of
the vital questions presented in this appeal. There is no determination as to whether a landowner is entitled to compensation for any reduction in the width of the street upon
which his property abuts or whether his easement of access
may be said to extend only to such portion and width of the
street as is reasonably necessary for the purposes of ingress
and egress of the abutting owner, considering the nature of
his property and the particular uses to which it is adaptable.
(7) The procedure to be followed in the ascertainment of
the new, property rights and the determination of the amount
of damages to be, awarded for interference with them is left
in complete uncertainty. The inconsistent pronouncements
of my associates upon these issues will,be a fruitful source of
litigation. They say that whether the proposed' improvement
has resulted in a substantial impairment of a property right
is a question of law or of fact, a contradictory statement b:npossible of application by the legal profession or the courts
upon the trial of a condemnation suitor on' an appeal. Adding to the confusion is the declaration' that 'the landowner is
entitled to the difference between the market value of the
entire parcel of land before a portion of it; is taken under ,
the power of eminent domain arid the,market value of the
land remaining after the severance,' although it is' declared
that certain elements diminishing theva1u~tnay,not'beicoIi~ ,
sidered. To me, such statements cim'only'meartthat thO$~
who have joined in the majority, opinio:n are not themselves
in agreement upon these questions and concur in, ambiguity
which hereafter may be' said to SUPP()rt either of the variant
positions.
"
,
(8) Although stating that a court, in defining ri~ht8
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claimed to be infringed in violation of the constitutional
provision, must balance against the necessity of safeguarding
private property the duty to see "that the cost of public improvements . . . be not unduly enhanced," the rule is not
applied.
(9) :Notwithstanding the admission that the trial judge
erred in instructing the jurors that the question as to whether
the respondents had suffered an infringement of their rights
in the property not sought to be condemned was one for
them to determine, my associatet:! decide that the court had,
by the admission of evidence, held that such impairment
would be suffered and therefore no prejudice resulted. Yet
the giving of this instruction completely negatives any prior
ruling by the court upon that issue. Furthermore, if such a
determination is a question of law, as stated in some parts
of the opinion, no ruling upon it could be "implied in the
verdict. " And if it is a question of fact, one is confronted
by the statement: "In no case is it a 'question of fact for the
jury' to determine."
To understand fully the respective rights of the property
owner and of the State requires, in my jUdgment, a more
complete statement of the nature and extent of the proposed
highway improvement than appears in the opinion of my
associates and a summary of the testimony upon which the
property owner was awarded damages. I shall therefore first
present facts additional to those detailed by them and then,
t:!onsidering all of the evidence which to me is relevant to the
questions for decision, state the reasons for my conclusion
that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and a
new trial ordered upon the issue of consequential damages.
As described by Mr.. Justice Shenk, because of the construction of an underpass with service roads parallel to it and
within the boundaries of the boulevard as widened, the State
is "re-routing the highway." Under any view of the testimony, this statement can apply only to Rosemead Boulevard.
And as to that thoroughfare, as well as Ramona Boulevard,
in my opinion the evidence shows only a widening of each
of them with lanes .and freeways designed in accordance
with modern requirements for the protection and acceleration of motor vehicles and the separation of grades ata
major traffic intersection.
The project for which part of the respondents' land ia
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being condemned may be readily comprehended from ~he
accompanYing photograph of a relief map used at the trIal.
The boundaries of the two parcels ?f lan~ own~d by the respondents, as they existed at the tIme t~IS actIon w.as c~m
menced, are outlined on the map. In d~Slgn the engmeenng
details for the widening and reconstructIOn of the two str~ets
are comparable to those of many iI?provements now bemg
planned for modernizing important hIghways to meet present
day needs.
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several hundred feet from the intersection of the two high.
ways the width of Route 168 will be 280 feet and that of
Route 26, including a center section carrying the railroad
tracks, 255 feet.
Using the street names in further description of the grade
separation project, north of Ramona Boulevard, the widening
of Rosemead Boulevard will end at Glendon Way, which is
the first intersecting street. The distance between them is
about 525 feet. To the east of Rosemead Boulevard, Ramona
Boulevard will occupy the increased area for a much greater
distance and far beyond the easterly line of the respondents'
land.
South of Glendon Way, Rosemead Boulevard will have two
roadways, each of which will be 35 feet wide. At a point in
the neighborhood of 150 feet south of Glendon Way, they
will commence to decline in a subway through which they
will be carried under Ramona Boulevard at a maximum· depth
of approximately 18 feet. For safety purposes, the two road·
ways will be divided by an area four feet in width and curb
high. Paralleling these traffic lanes the State will construct
what it terms "service roads" at approximately the present
grade of Rosemead Boulevard which will continue to Ramona
Boulevard. They will afford direct access to the adjacent
property.
The highway plans show that the portion of Ramona Bou·
levard to the north of the section used by the railroad is to
have a 35 foot freeway for westbound fast travel and an
outer lane 30 feet wide, also described as a service road, for
local use. The portion of Rosemead Boulevard to continue
at the present grade will intersect that part of Ramona Bou·
levard which is designed for local travel. When the two high.
ways are reconstructed, the land of the respondents not taken
by the State will have frontage on the "service roads" con·
necting with the center lanes reserved for tra~c through
the subway and also with Ramona Boulevard freeways.
Over the objections of the State, expert witnesses for the
property owners explained that they had considered as an
element of consequential damage the fact that the widening
of the two boulevards and the construction of the underpass
would block the respondents' land from access to the main
traveled portions of the highways except through the circuitous routes afforded by the outer lanes. They further testified,
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over a similar objection, that another factor entering into
their estimate of severance damages was what they termed
"loss of visibility."
One of these witnesses pointed out that before the highways are reconstructed a person may reach or leave the Ricciardi property at any point along its frontage on the two
streets. After the widening and reconstruction of Ramona
Boulevard, said he, the land "will have a direct contact only
on ... a narro.w lane or alley which has been termed by the
State as a serVIce road. On the west, the property which now
abuts .on Rosemead Boulevard will have no access [to it] ...
but WIll abut ... on another alley or lane or so-called service road." The service road paralleling Ramona Boulevard
he told the jury, "apparently is not carried out so that ther~
is any direct contact with the easterly end of Ramona Boulevard." It will be a dead end street, making it necessary "to
come through another opening at this point . . . down to
Ramona Boulevard."· . And only by following the service road
along the westerly boundary of the respondents' property
to Glendon Way may one reach Rosemead Boulevard.Moreover, by governmental regulation, in his opinion a left-hand
turn will be prohibited in the intersection of Giendon Way
and Rosemead Boulevard.
On the subject of loss of visibility the witness stated that
the difference in grade of the center travel lanes of Rosemead
~oul~vard ~nd ~he. construction of the subway· will greatly
ImpaIr efficle~t. Ingress to and egress from the property because one drIVIng north through the underpass will not be
able to see it before reaching the point where a turn can be
~a~~ .. As t~ travel in the opposite direction, he added, the
vIs~bIhty :vIII be greatly impaired by the change of grade
wh~ch ~egIns at Glendon Way. Using Rosemead Boulevard
a~ ~t WIll be reconstructed, in approaching the property "additIOnal means of perception" must be used.
. The same reason was given by another witness as the basis
In part, for his opinion concerning the amount of severanc;
damages which the respondents will sustain on account of
the loss ~f visibility. When the state's project is completed,
he explaIned, a traveler proceeding north under Ramona
Boulev.ard will not be able to see the Ricciardi property from
the POInt at the south entrance of the underpass where the
declIne cOnImences, to about the same relative place on the
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other side of the structure. He must then travel to Glendon
Way and turn back. And, by the time one. going in a southerly direction on Rosemead Boulevard arrIves ~t the former
southerly line of the Ricciardi property, he WIll then be 18
feet below the present grade of the highway. "It is my opinion" he concluded "that the view will be sufficiently interfer~d with so that 'anyone desiring to reach Mr. Ricciardi's
property will be inclined to lose his way on account of the
circuitous route and fail to reach the property for that
reason."
.
.'
A third appraiser in stating the factors he consId~red In
his estimate of the amount of severance damage whIch the
property owners will sustain by reason of the reconstruc~ion
of the two highways included among. them the followmg:
" ... Previous to the construction of the improvement Parcel
No. 1 had free and easy access or ingress and· egress both on.
Ramona Boulevard and on Rosemead Boulevard. . ., After
the construction of the proposed improvement . . . the two
center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard will be on a changing
grade along the entire frontage of th~ Ricciardi p:operty."
Continuing hIS testimony and speaking as .of a tIme when
the highways are rebuilt, he said that the ~cciardi pro~erty
"hasn't any egress or ingress whatever directly on eIther
Rosemead Boulevard or Ramona Boulevard. The only means
of ingress and egress is by service roads'. . ; which run in a
circuitous route from all directions, and in order to reach
the Ricciardi property it is necessary to take one of those
service roads from either Ramona Boulevard or Rosemead
Boulevard.... "
Upon this and other evidence, the jury awarded the respondents $9000 as the value of Parcel No.1, and $15,000 as
damages 'for its severance from the remainder of the property.
The value of Parcel No.2 was placed at $350, with no sever~
ance damages. No complaint is made concerning the amount
determined to be the value of the land taken from the respondents in connection with a street widening. and grade
separation project, but it is charged that the eVIdence does
not support the award of $15,000 made for severance damages.
Where a portion only of a landowner's property has been
taken for a public improvement, the question necessarily
arises as to the amount of compensation to which he is en·
titled for the reduction in value of the remaining parcel.
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the val.ue of the land ,taken by appraising the value of the
part With reference to the diminution in value of the whole.
~nother ~roup. of courts has stated that just compensation
m a partIal-taking case should be measured by the difference
between the market value of the whole before the taking and
the market value of the remainder after the takin
Th
formula accepted in the majority of states howeverg· is th:
value o! the part taken plus damages to the r;mainder. '(Orgel,
ValuatIOn. Under the Law of Eminent Domain, 1936, p. 218.)
My assocIates properly recognize that every diminution in
value of land caused by public improvement is not compensa.ble .under th~ eminent domain clause of the California Con~htu~IOn. I~ IS therefore apparent that the test to be used
In thIS state IS not the difference between the market value of
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. . d·IC t·IOn
.
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the. dIfference In market value of the entire parcel before the
takmg an~ the market value of the land remaining after the
severanc~ IS ~lear, for many acts of government resulting in
a reducti~n I~ the .value of private property may be per~ormed With ImpUnIty by citizens acting in their own self
lD~er~st. A .municipality, for example, may establish a publi~
bUIldIng serIOusly impairing the value of adjacent residential
pr?perty. It need 'pay n~ .compensation for this injury,1 but
neIthe.r would a prIvate CItizen be liable for a similar damage
resultm~ f:om the ~onstruction of an equally undesirable
office bUIldIng. ~bvlOusly, the value of real estate may de~rease very materIally as the result of the use which an adJ~cent property owner may lawfully make of his land and
s~nce the owner has no right of action against such an' indiVIdual for the damages thus caused, by the same token it may
1 The government may cond
. t
jail or "pest house" with emn prlva e. prope~ty and erect upon it a
for the undeniable im ir;ut compel!satmg adJacent property owners
such public Use. (See Wach~n~
:h~;r property values as a result of
[37 p 570 42 A St R
. 0 . nge e8 etc. By., 103 Cal. 614 617
City df Wlnche~to~· v.' ;l:;g,1~~]2; I~l~g~~~ v55g~tg~go[ll402NIEll. 64,' SO';
A.L.R. 520]· Ctty of Gea
M'
. . 833 36
distinguishing Oklah
C? v. V oore, lSI Okla. 616 [75 P.2d Sill]
oma 11/ v. etter, 72 Okla. 196 [179 P. 473].)
,
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not reasonably be said that compensation for similar damage
caused by the lawful use of property owned by the public
was intended to be guaranteed to private individuals under
the eminent domain clause of the California Constitution.
(Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19, 24 [119 P.
2d 1]; O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., 19
Cal.2d 61, 63 [119 P .2d 23].) Therefore, since such factors
may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value
of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the
state, it is apparent that the difference in market value before
and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining
recoverable compensation.
Moreover, any distinction predicated upon the allowance
of compensation for a reduction in value of land attributable
to a lawful use of state property because there has been an,
appropriation of part of it, when no compensation would be
awarded for the same element of damage without such a severance, is unsound. For, obviously, it would be unfair discrimination to reimburse a property owner for such damage
to his property simply because a portion of it, however small,
may have been condemned, while denying to one from whom
no land is taken recovery for a comparative reduction iIi value
of his land. To allow a recovery to one property owner but
not to another under such circumstances would obviously be
arbitrary and unsupportable under the provisions of article I,
section 14, of the California Constitution requiring compensation for a "damaging" as well as a "taking" of private
property'. Any language in Oolusa &7 Hamilton R. R. 00. v.
Leonard, 176 Cal. 109, 113 [167 P. 878], indicating the possible propriety of the distinction, is unwarranted and should
be disapproved. Although it may be, difficult, it is nevertheless necessary to exclude evidence as to that diminution in
value which an owner of land from which a part has been
taken may have suffered along with adjacent property owners
because of the use detrimental to the remainder of his property.
.
The present action concerns property to which the State
has title, and is now using, for highway purposes. Because
of this fact, "The inauguration of a new use of a highway
under proper authority within the general purposes for which
the highway was created, is generally held not to constitute
a 'taking or damaging' of the property of the abutting owner
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within the constitutional provision. The public has the right,
as against the owner of the fee, to prepare and reserve the
whole or a part of a highway for special forms of travel."
(18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, sec. 188, pp. 818, 819.) One
of the purposes, however, for which highways are created is
to provide a means of access to property abutting upon it.
Consequently, as stated by the majority opinion, the courts
have declared and enforced the property owner's right of
access to the highway on which his property abuts. But the
easement of access, properly defined, may be said to extend
only to such portion and width of the street as is reasonably
necessary for the purposes of ingress and egress of the abutting owner, considering the nature of his property and the
particular uses to which it is adaptable. (See Rose v. State
of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713, 728 [123 P.2d 505]; 1 Lewis,
Eminent Domain [3d ed. 1909], p. 190.) Accordingly, the
owner of abutting land has no absolute right, as against the
public, to insist that the adjacent street always remain available for use in the same manner and to the same extent as
when it vras constructed. Regulations such as the prescribing of one-way traffic or the prohibiting of left-hand turns
upon it may interfere to that extent with the right of access
without subjecting the municipality to liability for the resulting impairment. (See note, 100 A.L.R. 487, 491-493.)
The abutting owner's easement does not, therefore, as a
matter of law, entitle him to the use of the full width of the
street, nor does it include the right to a street wholly free of
obstruction. Thus the mere narrowing of a street is not ipso
facto an infringement of his right of access (Brown v. Board
of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 281 [57 P. 82] ; and see Bigley
v. Nunan, 53 Cal. 403), but where there is evidence shoWing
that the reduction in width has left a street insufficient in
width to afford ingress and egress in a reasonable manner,
an interference with his right is clearly established (Rose v.
State of California, supra). Similarly, a change in the grad(
of a street or the construction of an improvement thereon
does not per se constitute an interference with the right of
access (Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174, 175 [88 P. 713];
Montgomery v. Santa Ana etc. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 190 [37 P.
786, 43 Am.St.Rep.89, 25 L.R.A. 654] ; City of San Mateo v.
Railroad Commission, 9 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 10 [68 P.2d 713]), but
if the obstruction substantially interferes with ingress and
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egress to the property, considering its nature and the pa;ti~u
lar uses to which it is adaptable, the easement of access IS ~
paired. (Rose v. State of California, supra; Eachus v. C",ty
of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147] ;
Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [89 P.
330] j Lane v. San Diego Elec. By. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P.
109] ; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 CaL 67 [4 P.
2d 139].)
For example, in Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. By. ~o., ~upra.,
the defendant railway company made an exca:vatlOn ~ tJ;e
street in front of the plaintiff's property WhICh. v~ned In
depth from 20 to 28 feet, leaving ~nly a. l?-foot strIp m front
of the premises for access. And m W",Zliams :V. Los AngeZes
etc. R~/. Co., supra, the construction by the r~ilway company
of a sWl~"'.h and signal tower in the street m ~ront. of. the
plaintiff's business premises directly i~terfered WIth h~s right
of ingress and egress. Because the railway compa~y, m Lane
v.SanDiego Elec. By. Co., SUp1'a~ constructed Its track so
close to the plaintiff's land that a vehicle could not be parked
tn front of it while a streetcar passed by, the court held that
the landowners' right of access was substantially al!d seriously
impaired. Likewise, the construction of a pede~tnansubw~y
terminal so that it extended in front of and adJacent to onethird of the plaintiff's premises, which were zoned fo~ general business purposes, was held, in McCandless v. Ctty of
Los AngeZes, supra, to be a substantial impairment of the
owner's right of ingress and egress.
..'
,
The street improvement which occaslOned th~ ~ontroversy
in Rose v. State of California, supra, was very s~~r ~ that
shown in the present case. There, however, the ehmmatlOn. of
the grade crossing and construction ~f the subway le~t .lan4
fronting upon a 14-foot lane for vehIcular. traffic, an Insufli~
cient space to afford reasonable means for mgress ~d egre~s,
considering the possible use of the property for mdustrIal
purposes. According to the testimony, the lane was too narrow for two vehicles traveling in opposite' directions to pas~~
and upon the ground that the record. showed substantial eVldence to support the finding of interference with the easement
'of access, a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. In the
present case, however, after the project is completed, e respondents' property will abut, along the same two Sldes as
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before the improvement was begun, upon roadways 30 feet
in width. No facts are testified to by the witnesses for the
respondents showing that the 30-foot roadway provides an
insufficient means of access for a full and reasonable use of
the property, considering its nature and the particular uses
to which it is adaptable. Certainly no interference with the
easement of access for the use of the property as a slaughterhouse, with facilities for the operation of a wholesale and
retail meat market, is established merely by the fact that the
roadways are 30 feet wide.
It is true that the appraisers who testified on behalf of
the respondents premised their opinions as to severance
damages, at least in part, upon their conclusion that after
the subway project is completed, the Ricciardi property will
not have frontage on either Rosemead or Ramona, but on
what one of them described as a "narrow lane or alley"
That the roadways will not be narrow lanes or alleys is, apparent from their width and relation to the project as a
whole. Whether those upon which the property will front
will still be called "Rosemead" and "Ramona" boulevard
respect~vely, is not disclosed by the evidence, although th;
Co~~lU:SIOn that ~hey will be a part of those highways is implICIt In the testImony of one of the respondents' appraisers
who spoke of the roadway passing through the subway as
"the two center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard." (Italics
added.) B.ut, in any event, the solution of the problem of
compensatIOn depends upon much more fundamental cons~derations than the mere label or change in name of a partIcular street, and a property owner has no right to insist
upon the retention of a highway name.
Of more importance is the fact that, by resolution, the California Highway Commission has authorized the condemnati.on of the Ricciardi property for Route 168 of the state
hlgh~ay system, declaring "that the taking of said lands in
fee IS necessary to and for such public use and that it is
ne.cessary that all of said lands be so taken"; also "that the
saId proposed State highway is planned and located in a
~anner which will be most compatible with the greatest pubhc good and the least private injury." And according to
t~e map and the exhibits, only one right of way for state
hlgh~ay Route 168 is shown, which is the full width of approxImately 280 feet, the various separate construction de-
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tails being all within the exterior boundaries of tha~ right ~
of way. In addition, the explanation made by the state's
highway engineer, whose testimony is relied upon hy both'
the respondents and the appellant, shows that, Highway 168.'
in the vicinity of the subway project, with the service roads,
and the sloping walls, will be 280 feet in width, and, that:
the 255-foot right of way directly south of the premises' will'
be a part of' Route 26. He als~ testified that the service,
roads "were a part or the major plan" and "appurtenant
to the whQle thing as a unit." Unquestionably, the entire
280 feet of the widened Highway 168 and the 255 feet which,
with the exception of the railroad tracks in the center, is
to be occupied by Highway 26, will. be used ~or essential
highway purposes, title to all of this land being in, the state.
Obviously, the safety objectives of the subway would be to
a seriollil degree defeated should traffic be allowed to enter or,
cross the main flow of passage through it at the entrances to
the tunnel. Additional complications also would, arise through
the change in grade necessary for the vehicular traffic to
pass beneath the railway tra.cks on Rosemead. Under such
circumstances, the aptly designated service roads are necessary to the successful utilization of the subway, form an essential part of the project for separation of grades and will'
furnish the only reasonable means for the owners of land now
abutting on Rosemead Boulevard as presently constructed,
and those others of the public who presently approach Rosemead along the north side or the' railroad tracks on Ramona,
'
safely to enter the through flow of traffic on Rosemead.
So far as the owners of or visitors to the Ricciardi property
are concerned, upon the completion of the contemplated improvement, they will still have unobstructed access to the highway system. Arter the changes are completed, if they wish
to travel west they may either immediately turn into tho
westbound freeway of Highway 26 through the opening in
the cubing separating the Ramona service road from the
freeway, which is located at the corner of their premises, or
continue over the subway on the service road in a westerly
direction until they choose to enter the freeway at some subsequent opening in the curbing. In going east, they may
immediately go in an easterly direction along the Ramona
service road until they come to the fi:rst intersection crossing
the railroad tracks, where they may enter the eastbound
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freeway of Ramona located just south of the railway right of
way. Similarly, in traveling north, they may immediately
go north on the service road paralleling the through channels of Rosemead and enter those lanes at Glendon Way.
The only direction in which they may not immediately travel
is to the south on Rosemead. In order to go south, they must
travel north on either of the service roads paralleling the subway structure and then turn into the southbound traffic on
the lanes of Rosemead leading to the underpass. But the fact
that the particular portion of the highway system upon which
they will immediately travel does not directly enter into "the
two center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard" is because such an
entry would be unsafe, and also impracticable because of the
change in grade necessitated for the underpass. And if they
were allowed to cross the railway tracks, upon the same grade
as the track, in order to enter the service roads paralleling
Rosemead on the south side of the underpass, one of the essential objectives in constructing the subway would be lost.
The additional distance which they must travel before entering ~he main flow of traffic on Rosemead is required by the
publIc safety and the proper and reasonable construction of
the subway. It is no different from the additional distances
one must travel because of traffic regulations or the construction of divided highways. Under these circumstances as the
respondents will be afforded full and unobstructed a~cess to
streets bordering their premises on the same sides as their
property presently abuts on the highways, and it will be suf~cient for their needs of ingress and egress, no compensation.
IS recoverabl~ merely because of the additional dista:q.ce they
must travel m the public street before they will be able to
turn into the lanes of traffic leading under the subway, so
that they may travel south on Rosemead Boulevard.
But the respondents claim that the service roads will be
constructed as a means of compensating the abutting owners
in lieu of. paying thl3m in money for the damage resulting
~rom the Improvement. Those joining in the majority opinIOn have been misled by this specious argument, as shown by
their statement: "In providing for the service roads the state
must be deemed to have proceeded in frank recognition of the
private right of access possessed by the defendants that such
right would be invaded, and intended by means of ~hose service roads to minimize and entirely absorb the damages to
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which the defendants would otherwise be entitled." But,
as is clearly apparent from the evidence, the vital purpose of
the service roads is to provide a means for Highway 168 to
connect with Highway 26 so that traffic can flow between
them, and this fact is conclusively shown from the resolution
of the Highway Commission. And since an earlier junction
of the service road with the underpass highway would safely
be impracticable at any more southerly point than Glendon
Way, the means adopted are not unreasonably more drastic
than necessary to achieve the ends essential to the construction and completion of the Rosemead and Ramona crossing
at the separated grades required for the underpass.
The basic error of the majority opinion in allowing recovery for the additional distance travelers to and from the Ricciardi property must go in order to reach the through lanes
of traffic upon Rosemead Boulevard, lies in its misconception
of the right of access of an abutting owner upon the highway
system. For the owner's right of access is only over whatever
street or portion of the highway system exists upon a particular boundary of his property, provided that full and unobstructed ingress and egress to and from his property to an
extent reasonably necessary for its full beneficial use is unimpaired. He has no vested right in any particular avenue of
the highway carrying any particular flow of traffic, but only
a right to have his land front upon a part of the highway
system sufficient to afford reasonable access to his property.
The fallacy of my associates' reasoning in this regard is illustrated by the statement: "We recognize that the defendants
right in any particular
flow of traffic
over
have no property
.
.'
,. (;.,"'.
.. r
"':
the highway adjacent to their property, but ,they dO.p()ssess
the right of direct access to the through traffic highway and
an easement of view of their property fromsucbhighway.
If traffic normally flowing over that highway were' re-routed
or if another highway were constructed, which resulted in a
substantial amount of traffic being diverted from that through
highway the value of their property might be diminished, but
in such event defendants would have no right to compensation
by reason of such re-routing or diversion of traffic. The rerouting or diversion of traffic in such a case would be a mere
police power regulation, or the incidental result of a lawful
act, and not the taking or damaging of a property right. But
here we do not have a mere re-routing or diversion of traffic
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from the highway; we have, instead, a substantial change in
the highway itself in relation to the defendants' property
rather than a mere re-routing of traffic in relation to the
highway. Defendants' private property rights in and to that
highway are to be taken and damaged. It is only for such
private property rights that compensation has been assessed.
The court allows no damages to be predicated ou any diversion
of traffic from the highway but it did properly allow damages to be based on diversion of the highway from direct
access to defendants' proper-~y."
If this language means anything, it creates in an abutting
own~r a vested right in a specific traffic avenue carrying a
p~rtlc.ular .bur~en of traffic. Carried out to its necessary imp~I~atlOn, .It wIll also entitle the property owner upon -an undIVIded hIghway to damages whenever the street is reconstruc~ed, in accordance with modern highway engineering
~rac~Ice fo~ the safety and convenience of the traveling pubh~, . mto hlghsp~ed separated freeways for through traffic
dIVIded by. curbIngs from lanes constructed for purposes of
local and mtersecting traffic, with openings into the main
freeways only at comparatively widely spaced intervals. For
obviously, under such circumstances, the abutting owner no
longer may go directly from his property to the lanes of the
highway carrying the through traffic, upon which his land
formerly abutted. More specifically, the majority opinion
app~oves an award of damages based in part not only upon
testlmony that the respondents' land will be less valuable
because of the additional distance one must travel from it in
order to reach the through lanes upon Rosemead Boulevard
b~t also, although not expressly stated, for the additionai
dIstance one must travel on the lanes for local traffic which
are a part of Ramona Boulevard before he may enter the freeways carrying the main flow of traffic along that highway.
The prohibiti:ve effect which the allowance of recovery for
such a factor ~Ill have upon ~he construction of increasingly
necessary arterIal freeways, WIthout grade crossings, to serve
c~nters_of large population, is readily apparent when one conSIders such contemplated highway projects as the proposed
Bayshore freeway to bear the traffic from San Francisco
down the Peninsula. a~ far as Palo Alto and, eventually, to
San Jose, and the sImllar freeway being considered for traffic from San Fernando to San Pedro in Los Angeles County,
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both of which include numerous structures fqrgrade separa~;
tion similar to that shown by the plans in the present case.,
And it may also be assumed that, in 8.cco~dallce wi~h- st~d.
ardized engineering practice, a substantial p,ortion . . of these,
highways will be built at a grade much lower than adjoining,
.
streets.
But the majority opinion adopts a rule, creating a property
right never before recognized, without t~e citation of a single;
authority in support of its unique position. As a· matter of
fact,. the law throughout the United States is uniformly ,to the,
contrary. For example, in what is probably the most recellt
case involving the problem, it was held that the owner of.
property could not recover consequential damages because<
travelers to and from his premises would have to travel a
distance of approximately 2,000 feet farther in order to reach
the newly located highway. (In re ~oard ofSup~r8 of Ohenango Oounty, 13 N.Y.S.2d 730 [1939].) Consequently, even
if it is accurate to state that the proposed improvement will
result in a "diversion of the highway from direct access to defendants' property," no recovery should be permitted.
Furthermore, it is apparent that, despite such juggling of
words as "re-routing of traffic" as distinguished from "rerouting of the highway," the element of damage involved in
either is the same. The diminution in value, if any, to an
abutting landowner will arise from the fact that the traffic
formerly passing adjacent to his property will no longer be
able directly to reach his land without traveling an additional
distance. And, as the majority opinion has recognized, the
law is settled in this state that such an element of damage is
noncompensable. (Rose v. State o/Oalifornia, supra, at p. 737 j
Oity of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal.App. 760, 762, 763 [31
P.2d 467] j People v. Gianni, 130 Cal.App. 584 [20 P.2d 87].)
And although I am convinced that the service roads are
an essential and integral part of Highway 168, even were the
majority opinion's treatment of them as entirely separate
and distinct highways correct, the· allowance of recovery for
the additional distance to be traveled in order to ,reach the
main highway is squarely contrary to the limitations whic.h
these same members of the court have placed upon damage
caused by circuity of travel in the cul-de-sac cases, by the
decision in Bacielt v. Board of Oontrol, ante, p. 343 [144
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P.2d 818]. For since the Ricciardi property is located upon
a corner which abuts upon roadways with an outlet at either
end into connecting streets, it is not located in a cul-de-sac.
In estimating the severance damages suffered by the respondents, their appraisers testified to a loss of visibility
which will occur by reason of the construction of the subway.
However, as there will be no impairment of view from the
Ricciardi property caused by the change in grade of the lanes
passing through the underpass or by the subway structure,
the problem is factually limited to whether an owner of land
has an easement of view of his premises from the street or
highway which entitles him to compensation because, by the
change in grade necessitated for vehicles to travel through an
underpass, his property cannot be seen at all times.
My associates' treatment of the question is summary. "The
weight of authority seems to be in favor of the proposition
that an abutting owner of property on a public highway has
an easement of reasonable' view of his property from the
highway," states the opinion. "The right of reasonable view,
in addition to the right of ingress and egress, is named as one
of the easements possessed by the abutting owner in Williams
v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. 00., 150 Cal. 592, 595 [89 P. 330]."
However, although the rule stated is correct insofar as
it goes, it has no application to the facts of this case. For
the doctrine of the decisions cited in the annotation relied
upon by the majority opinion in support of its statement
more accurately is that there is an easement or property right
of view both to and from the street as against obstruction by
an adjoining owner or other private individual. But no such
right exists as against the state when the view of the premises by passersby is impaired by the erection of such structures as are reasonably necessary to secure the safety or promote the convenience of the traveling public. (Perlmutter
v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327 [182 N.E. 5, 81 A.L.R. 1543]; McOarthy v. Oity of Minneapolis, 203 Minn. 427 [281 N.W.
759] ; 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain, sttpra, sec. 124, pp. 191193; 25 Am.Jur., Highways, sec. 155, pp. 451, 452, sec. 319,
p. 613; and see Kelbro Inc. v. Myrick (1943), 113 Vt. 64 [30
A.2d 527, 530, 531] ; but see Liddick v. Oity of Oouncil BlUffs
(1942), Iowa [5 N.W.2d 361, 374, 379]; 4 McQuillin, op. cit., sec. 1488, p. 198; notes, 90 A.L.R. 793, 40
A.L.R. 1321.)
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Thus, in Lewis on Eminent Domain, although the author
recognizes the right of the abutting owner to an unobstructed
view to and from any part of the street, he declares: I I This
right is subject of course to all legitimate street uses, but it
cannot be interfered with for private purposes with or without compensation nor by structures placed ill the street for
public purposes which are not legitimate street uses, unless
compensation is made." (2 Lewison Eminent D?main l3d
ed. 1909], sec. 124, pp. 192, 193.) . And American Jurisprudence states the rule as follows: "It is wen established that
an abutting owner has also an easement of view' of his premises from every part of the street or' highway, as .well as
from his premises into the way, of which he ca:nnot be deprived by encroachments placed on the way by an adjacent
proprietor, although there are some holdings to the contrary.
But such easement of view is likewise subject to the
enjoyment of the public right in the highway, and the erection by the public authorities of such structures as are reasonably necessary to secure the safety or promote the conve-'
nience of travelers does not constitute an unlawful interference therewith." (25 Am.Jur., Highways, sec. 155, p. 452.)
This principle is recognized in Williams v. Los Angeles
etc. By., supra, where the court indicated that the private
railway company would not have been subject to liability for
impairment of the right of view by the erection of a switch
tower in front of the plaintiffs' premises had the construction
of the tower been essential for the operation of the railway.
The reason for such distinction is obvious. An adjoining
landowner obviously has no right to place obstructions in th~
public highway to the detriment of the owner of abutting
property. He is, however, free to erect whatever structures
he sees fit within the boundaries of hiS property, even though
such structures may interfere with the 'fotnier view enjoyed
by his neighbor and .cause reduction in ilievalue of the latter's land. A similar situation arises ,when' the state'for ad~
mittedly proper highway purposes erects n:ec~ssarY ~~ry,ctu,rEt~
for the convenience or safety of. traffic, and the state should'
no more be required to pay for the re:sftltlng damage toabut~
ting owners than would the private: person Jor lawful ac~
upon his land. Consequently since, mth.e present case, the
portions of the highway from which
-rlewof the Ricciardi
premises will be possible must be'lowered'korder to carry
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the traffic beneath the railroad tracks in furtherance of an
undeniably proper highway purpose, no compensation should
be allowed the respondents for such interference with the passing traffic's view of his land.
In considering the function of the court and the jury in
It' condemnation action, the majority opinion states that
whether there has been a substantial impairment of a property right, "is a question of law, or of fact, or a mixed ques,tion of law and fact, for the trial court to determine., In no
case is it a 'question of fact for the jury' to determine."
. This statement is fundamentally unsound and confusing. An
issue of fact determinable by the court may, under certain
circumstances, be submitted to the jury. (See cases collected
in 10 Cal.Jur. Eminent Domain, sec. 107, p. 411.) And upon
an appeal from the judgment, if the issue is one of fact, the
sole duty of the appellate court is to ascertain whether there
is evidence, or inferences properly to be drawn from the evidence, in support of. the determination. On the other hand,
if the issue is one of law, the court must exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence presented by the record.
As I understand the authorities upon this subject, the nature and extent of a property right within the meaning of
the eminent domain provision of the Constitution presents a
question of law. Where, however, the right is so defined that
its extent or impairment depends upon a factual element,
such as, in the present case, the limitation of the easement ,of
access to such portion and width of the street as is reasonably
necessary for the purposes of ingress and egress of the abutting owner, considering the nature of his property and the
particular uses to which it is adaptable, the determination
of this variable factor clearly falls within the province of
the trier of fact even though its decision upon that question
I]lecessarily includes a finding as to whether an impairment
of the easement has occurred. Of course, the question as to
the amount of injury sustained is one for the trier of fact
to determine upon evidence confined to compensable items
of damage.
. In my opinion, for the reasons stated, the judgment should
be affirmed insofar as it awards the respondents $9,350 for
the land appropriated by the State; as to the amount awarded
for consequential damages. the judgment should be reversed
for a new trial upon that isl>ue.
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CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the.
dissenting opinion.
T.RAYNOR, J.-I dissent for reasons·setiforth in my dia-:
senting opinion in Bacich v. Board of, ControZ, ante, p. 343
[144 P.2d $18].
.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing wail dehied January'
17, 1944. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and'Traynor,J., voted.

for a rehearing.
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Oase'""'-'Ooif1uilt with'
Supreme Court Decision.-In a habeas'corpus .proceeding' to'
obtain release from prison, the prior decisionofd;he; ,D,ismct;·
Court of Appeal, in affirming petitioner's conviction" that, he·
was to be considered a first offender,. was the lawo~ the case,'
even though the Supreme Courtsubseq1l;entlyheldin, another
similar case that the Board of Prison Terms and :paroles might
consider the accompanying record ~hich showed that, .while
the judgment was silent thereon, the offender had sUffered a
prior conviction.

[1] Criminal Law - Appeal- Law of the

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to,;secnre. release from
custody. Petitioner remanded to .custody ·without··prejndice'
to a redetermination by Board of Prison Terms' and Paroles
,
of sentence to be s e r v e d . '
Andrew Schneider in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and David K. Lener,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-On September 14, 1938, the petitioner was
sentenced to serve the period of time prescribed by law in
the State Prison at Folsom for violation of section 476a of
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 56~; 3 Am.Jur. 541.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 1259.
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